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At the beginning of his famous proem to Isis and Osiris, Plutarch underlines the great 
importance of our pursuit of the truth about the gods. This pursuit is even regarded 
as a longing for divinity (351E: θειότητος ὄρεξις1), for the very blessedness of the 
1 An obvious allusion to the traditional end of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, which Plutarch fully endor-
sed; see on this esp. Becchi 1996, where much relevant material from both Plutarch and other 
Platonists is conveniently listed. A detailed analysis of the introduction to Isis and Osiris can 
be found in Roskam 2014.
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In this article, I deal with a short but complex sentence at the end of the first chapter of 
Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris. Plutarch there says that «the happiness of even the eternal life, 
which God has obtained as his portion, consists in the fact that the things that come to be do 
not, through knowledge, fail in advance» (351E). This obscure phrase implies, so I argue, 
that Plutarch’s providential God has a knowledge of particular contingencies and that this 
knowledge indeed contributes to his eternal blessedness without affecting His essence.
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En este artículo, me ocupo de una breve pero compleja frase al final del primer capítulo de la obra 
de Plutarco Isis y Osiris. Dice Plutarco que «la felicidad incluso de la vida eterna, que Dios ha 
obtenido como su porción, consiste en el hecho de que las cosas que llegan a ser no fracasan por 
adelantado gracias al conocimiento» (351E). Esta oscura frase implica, en mi opinión, que el Dios 
providencial de Plutarco tiene un conocimiento de las contingencias particulares y que este cono-
cimiento contribuye efectivamente a su bienaventuranza eterna sin que ello afecte a Su esencia.
Palabras clave: Plutarco; Isis y Osiris; conocimiento divino; bendición divina.
* I am much indebted to the two anonymous referees of the journal, who pointed to some 
difficulties of my argument in an earlier draft of this article and encouraged me to clarify my 
view. They should not be held responsible for remaining shortcomings.
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god does not consist in material wealth or power but in knowledge and intelligence 
(351D). After a brief allusion to Homer (Il. XIII 354-355), Plutarch concludes the 
chapter with the following idea2:
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς, ἣν ὁ θεὸς εἴληχεν, εὔδαιμον εἶναι τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ 
προαπολείπειν τὰ γιγνόμενα· τοῦ δὲ γιγνώσκειν τὰ ὄντα καὶ φρονεῖν ἀφαιρεθέντος, 
οὐ βίον ἀλλὰ χρόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν (351E).
τό om. Laur. 80.5; προαπολείπειν Bernardakis; προαπολιπεῖν manuscripts; τὰ γιγνόμενα 
manuscripts; τὰ γινωσκόμενα Wyttenbach; τῶν γινομένων Reiske.
This is a very important but also a particularly difficult sentence. The prob-
lem mainly concerns the precise meaning of the obscure phrase τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ 
προαπολείπειν τὰ γιγνόμενα, which has, as far as I know, as yet never been un-
derstood correctly. Basically three alternative interpretations have been proposed 
thus far.
1) The first interpretation (Meunier, Hopfner, Cavalli) connects the happiness of 
the eternal life with its knowledge of everything that exists3. This interpretation has 
important advantages from a philosophical point of view, in that it enables to situate 
the god firmly on his own intelligible realm. And that is indeed what we could expect 
in Plutarch’s Platonic perspective. Elsewhere in Isis and Osiris, we read that Osiris is 
«far removed from the earth, undefiled, unpolluted and pure from any being that is 
subjected to decay and death» (382F) and that Zeus’ «mind and reason are of them-
selves fixed amid the unseen and unperceived» (376C). The most important problem 
with this interpretation, however, which also distinguishes it from the others, is that 
it interprets τὰ γιγνόμενα as «everything that (really) exists” («was (wahrhaft) exis-
tiert» [Hopfner] or «la realtà degli avvenimenti» [Cavalli]). Thus, it actually equates 
τὰ γιγνόμενα with the following τὰ ὄντα. Such a blurring of ontological levels is 
quite unlikely for a Platonist like Plutarch and moreover, the interpretation thus 
seems to ignore the connection between the two parts of the sentence: the particle δέ 
(instead of γάρ) in fact shows that the second part is not meant as a further explana-
2 I follow the most recent edition of the treatise, by Bernardakis - Ingenkamp 2009.
3 Meunier 1924, p. 22: «le bonheur de l’existence éternelle, qui est l’apanage de Dieu, 
consiste en ceci, à savoir que rien de tout ce qui est ne peut échapper à sa connaissance»; 
Hopfner 1941, p. 3: «Ich glaube nämlich, daß die Seeligkeit des ewigen Lebens, dessen Gott 
teilhaftig ward, nur darin besteht, daß es an Erkenntnis nicht hinter all dem zurückbleibt, was 
(wahrhaft) existiert»; Cavalli 1985, p. 57: «ancora nel fatto che la conoscenza divina possiede 
per sempre la realtà degli avvenimenti, consiste l’eccellenza di quella vita eterna che al dio 
appartiene».
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tion but rather introduces something new. Opsomer ventured an interesting attempt 
to both have the cake of this interpretation and eat it, that is, to carefully maintain 
the distinction between the levels of τὰ γιγνόμενα and τὰ ὄντα while at the same 
time keeping God in the intelligible realm. He argues that God’s knowledge concerns 
first of all intelligible being, and then also the world to the extent that the latter par-
ticipates in intelligibility4. This is a clever suggestion that succeeds in safeguarding 
Plutarch’s philosophical consistency, but it is difficult of course to read all this in the 
simple concept of τὰ γιγνόμενα.
2) The second alternative (Babbitt, Froidefond) connects the happiness of the eter-
nal life with God’s prescience of events5. This interpretation first of all raises some 
grammatical problems, notably concerning the dative τῇ γνώσει. Among the transla-
tions listed in note 5, those of Babbitt, Cilento, Valgiglio, Pordomingo Pardo and García 
Valdés require a genitive (which is the usual complement of προαπολείπειν; cf. LSJ 
ad loc.), that of Griffiths an accusative (as the subject of προαπολείπειν). Furthermore, 
the precise meaning of the verb προαπολείπειν (left untranslated by Froidefond) is not 
«escape» but «leave before» or «fail before». In this light, all these translations more 
or less ignore the precise semantic value of the verb προαπολείπειν and its combina-
tion in this passage with a dative instead of a genitive. An obvious advantage of this 
interpretation, as compared to the first alternative, is that it does at least justice to the 
philosophical sense of τὰ γιγνόμενα, yet it also causes a new philosophical problem. 
God’s absolute prescience of events most likely implies the loss of human free will6, 
and this is utterly unacceptable for Plutarch.
4 Opsomer 1997, p. 350: «on peut, me semble-t-il, avancer l’hypothèse que la science 
divine se rapporte d’abord à l’être intelligible, et secondairement au monde dans la mesure 
où celui-ci participe à l’intelligibilité» (his italics).
5 Babbitt 1936, p. 9: «a source of happiness in the eternal life, which is the lot of God, is that 
events which come to pass do not escape His prescience»; Froidefond 1988, p. 178: «la béatitude 
de la vie éternelle, privilège de la divinité, consiste dans la prescience de ce qui va être». We 
may also compare the following translations, which are better in that they are more neutral, but 
which involve basically the same grammatical problems as those of Babbitt and Froidefond: 
Cilento 1962, p. 9: «l’essenza della beatitudine, nella vita eterna che Dio ebbe in sorte, consiste 
nel fatto che gli avvenimenti non possono sfuggire alla sua conoscenza»; Griffiths 1970, p. 119: 
«the happiness which marks even the eternal life which God enjoys consists in the fact that his 
knowledge does not lag behind events»; Valgiglio 1988, p. 15: «La sua felicità consiste [...] nel 
fatto che gli avvenimenti non possono sfuggire alla sua conoscenza»; Pordomingo Pardo 1995, 
p. 62: «la dicha de la vida eterna, que es la suerte de la divinidad, radica en que los aconte-
cimientos no escapan a su conocimiento»; García Valdés 1995, p. 57: «la felicidad de la vida 
eterna, que es lote del dios, consiste en que los acontecimientos no escapan a su conocimiento».
6 Cf. Opsomer 1997, p. 350.
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3) The third interpretation (Bernard) is, to my mind, the best one: God’s hap-
piness lies in the fact that he, in his knowledge, does not in advance leave behind 
the things that come to be7. This alternative differs from the first interpretation in 
that it correctly interprets τὰ γιγνόμενα as things that come to be (rather than things 
that really are), and improves on the second interpretation by avoiding the notion of 
prescience and by staying quite close to the Greek text. Yet two minor problems may 
be raised. First, the dative τῇ γνώσει («in der Erkenntnis») should in all likelihood 
rather be understood as causal, as appears from a perfect parallel in Against the Stoics 
on common conceptions8. Second, Bernard assumes a transitive use of προαπολείπειν 
(«vorher hinter sich läßt»), whereas in the overwhelming majority of cases, Plutarch 
uses the verb in an intransitive way9. As a matter of fact, there are only two instances 
in the entire Corpus Plutarcheum where προαπολείπειν is apparently used transi-
tively. Both occur in the same section of On moral virtue and since neither of them 
is unproblematic10, it is safe to say that an intransitive sense would be more in line 
with the Plutarchan style. In this respect, the translations grouped together under the 
second alternative prove superior.
Apart from these two minor quibbles, Bernard’s overall interpretation of the 
meaning of this passage raises some further questions. He understands the phrase 
against the background of an opposition between divine and human knowledge. 
7 Bernard 1990, p. 206: «daß <Gott> in der Erkenntnis das Werdende nicht vorher hinter 
sich läßt».
8 De comm. not. 1078F: ἀνίσων γὰρ νοουμένων, τὸ μὲν προαπολείπεται τοῖς ἐσχάτοις 
μέρεσι τὸ δὲ παραλλάττει καὶ περίεστι, which is translated by Cherniss (LCL) as «when things 
are conceived as unequal, it is by the ultimate parts that the one leaves off before the other 
and the other passes it by and is in excess of it».
9 De ad. et am. 74E; De sera num. 558C; An seni 787B, 789D and 797D; De facie 937A; 
De comm. not. 1078F and 1080A.
10 The phrase προενδίδωσιν ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ προαπολείπει τὸ καλόν in De virt. mor. 444C is 
ambivalent and may be understood either way. Most interpretations assume a transitive use 
here (e.g. Babbitt [LCL] ad loc.: «the impulsion yields too soon and prematurely forsakes 
the good»; similarly Babut 1969, p. 100: «l’impulsion se relâche prématurément et reste en 
deçà du bien» and Becchi 1990, p. 91: «l’impulso si rilassa e cede prima di raggiungere il 
bene»), but an intransitive interpretation is perfectly possible as well: «the impulsion yields 
too soon and the good prematurely takes its leave». The second occurrence is less ambivalent: 
ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ μέτριον ἢ προαπολείποντες (444B). I grant that the most natural interpre-
tation here would probably assume that τὸ μέτριον is the object of both verbs, although I am 
not sure whether this is the only possible interpretation, or even the correct one. To my mind, 
it cannot be excluded that even here, the verb is used intransitively, as everywhere else in 
Plutarch’s works, but even apart from this, a note of caution is in place here, since a couple 
of manuscripts appear to read ἀπολείποντες instead of προαπολείποντες.
N O T A S  E  I N F O R M A C I Ó N 161
Emerita LXXXIII 1, 2015, pp. 157-164 ISSN 0013-6662 doi: 10.3989/emerita.2015.08.1334
Human beings, on the one hand, need to go from τὰ γιγνόμενα to τὰ ὄντα in order 
to reach true knowledge. God, on the other hand, knows being directly and thus 
need not follow such a course11. This general explanation makes perfect sense from 
a Platonic perspective, but it does not do away with all interpretative difficulties. 
For this particular passage simply does not deal with a contrast between human 
and divine knowledge, and even in the broader context Plutarch never discusses the 
importance of τὰ γιγνόμενα for human knowledge. The sentence rather concerns 
divine eternal happiness and the significance of a particular kind of knowledge for 
this happiness.
It is time now to turn to the sentence as a whole. I first propose a literal transla-
tion, which keeps as close to the Greek as possible and tries to do justice to the dative 
τῇ γνώσει, to the intransitive use of προαπολείπειν, to the significance of the particle 
δέ and to the Platonic distinction between τὰ γιγνόμενα and τὰ ὄντα:
In my opinion, the happiness of even the eternal life, which God has obtained as his 
portion, consists in the fact that the things that come to be do not, through knowledge, 
fail in advance. But if one takes away knowledge of what exists and thinking, immor-
tality would not be life but a mere passage of time.
If this literal translation of the passage indeed succeeds in solving the above men-
tioned problems, it is bought at a high cost. I voluntarily agree that it is quite abstruse 
and is unlikely to be readily understood. When I still stick to it for the time being, it 
is because I first want to keep very close to the Greek text, which is far from useless 
in view of all the interpretative problems mentioned above. Moreover, it may help to 
see how tantalisingly obscure Plutarch’s own phrasing actually is. We may presume 
that Clea, the dedicatee of the treatise, or any other ancient reader, may have paused 
here for a moment to ponder on the precise meaning of the sentence.
It is clear, then, that this literal translation is in need of some further comment, 
unless we would fall into the trap of explaining obscurum per obscurius. Let us thus 
try to further clarify the sense of this complex argument. As argued above, the con-
nective particle δέ links two different moves in the argument. The second step is the 
clearest one: thanks to God’s knowledge of what really is (τὰ ὄντα), his immortality 
surpasses the mere lapse of time and becomes true living. This is the intelligible 
level. God is more than simply τὸ ἄφθαρτον: he is a conscious living being who 
knows what is. But if we turn to God’s happiness, yet another component comes into 
11 Bernard 1990, p. 206: «Der Mensch muß gemäß platonischer Auffassung die Stufe der 
Erkenntnis des Werdenden erst übersteigen, um zur Erkenntnis des Seienden zu gelangen. Gott hin-
gegen hat in seiner Erkenntnis keinen solchen Weg zurückzulegen, da er das Seiende unmittelbar 
erkennt. In diesem Sinne ist nur Gott zu echter Erkenntnis fähig, wie Plutarch vorher gesagt hat».
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play, and this is introduced in the tantalising phrase τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ προαπολείπειν 
τὰ γιγνόμενα. It is through his knowledge (causal dative) that God does not leave τὰ 
γιγνόμενα beforehand, or intransitively, that these γιγνόμενα do not fail in advance. 
To my mind the prefix προ- is an important key for a correct understanding of what 
this precisely means12. It obviously denotes that something happens «before» some-
thing else. But what happens before what? From a general Platonic point of view, we 
could expect that the intelligible realm a priori excludes any attention to the phenom-
ena. That would mean that these phenomena are left behind «before» one turns to 
the intelligible world, or, in other terms, that the γιγνόμενα fail «before» one reaches 
the level of knowledge (γνῶσις). What we get in this passage is exactly the opposite. 
Plutarch is thinking of a kind of knowledge through which these γιγνόμενα are not 
a priori left behind. God’s knowledge is such that it is not exclusively concerned 
with the intelligible but also shows a certain openness for concrete events. This is 
basically in line with a passage from On the decline of oracles, where Plutarch argues 
that Zeus is not merely focusing on himself alone13.
But if this holds true, we risk to fall from Scylla into Charybdis. For we indeed 
immediately touch upon another philosophical conundrum that was already men-
tioned above. Is human freedom not directly menaced by this divine knowledge of 
τὰ γιγνόμενα? Not necessarily. Plutarch nowhere says that he is thinking of presci-
ence. The opposite is rather true: the fact that τὰ γιγνόμενα are not a priori excluded, 
may well suggest that God only comes to know them at the very moment that they 
come to be. This implies a quite dynamic conception of God. His knowledge has 
nothing static, is not limited to real being, to what a Platonist would call ὄντως ὄν, 
but takes into account contingent events too. Now Plutarch does not go so far as to 
conclude that this knowledge of particular contingencies also affects God’s essence14, 
yet he does argue in this striking passage that it is at least partly constitutive of his 
eternal blessedness, and even that is quite a radical and remarkable conclusion for 
a Platonist. I would regard this position as the crystalization of the ultimate con-
sequence of Plutarch’s providential thinking of God. For Plutarch’s God is a lover 
12 One of the referees perceptibly warns against overinterpreting the prefix προ-, as it 
may, after all, only reflect a tendency that we often find in Plutarch, that is, the fondness for 
an accumulation of prefixes. This caueat makes sense indeed, yet to my mind, we should 
prefer, if possible, an interpretation that can do justice to the full (philosophical) relevance 
of the prefix προ-.
13 De def. or. 426D: οὐδ᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἄλλο δ᾿ οὐδέν, ὡς ᾠήθησαν ἔνιοι, νοῶν; the polemical 
reference is to Aristotle; cf. the excellent discussion of Ferrari 1999.
14 For Plutarch, God is fundamentally ἀπαθής; see, e.g., De def. or. 419A; cf. De prof. 
in virt. 83E.
N O T A S  E  I N F O R M A C I Ó N 163
Emerita LXXXIII 1, 2015, pp. 157-164 ISSN 0013-6662 doi: 10.3989/emerita.2015.08.1334
of mankind (φιλάνθρωπος)15 who derives pleasure from the mere act of being gra-
cious and doing good (Friends and Flatterers 63F). To the extent, then, that God’s 
providence contributes to his happiness and that his knowledge of τὰ γιγνόμενα is a 
necessary condition for his providential working16, we may indeed conclude that this 
knowledge directly contributes to God’s eternal blessedness.
If all this is true, it is clear that this passage at the outset of Isis and Osiris raises 
problems that have to do with the very core of Plutarch’s philosophical and theologi-
cal convictions. It also illustrates important and recurrent characteristics of Plutarch’s 
thinking about God. We saw that he here develops a particularly high-minded and 
dynamic conception of God that can be reconciled with his fundamental outlook as 
a Platonist philosopher. And we may finally add that the passage also allows us a 
glimpse into the heart of Plutarch, the priest of Apollo. After all, if there was one 
place on earth where it became tangibly clear what it meant that τὰ γιγνόμενα need 
not προαπολείπειν because of God’s knowledge, it was certainly Delphi.
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